On Mon, 12 Jul 2004, Aviv Raff wrote:
As you may already know the Mozilla's "patch" for the shell protocol
security issue is merely a global configuration change. But is it
enough?
No. As someone has already pointed out, Mozilla should whitelist safe
external protocols rather than blacklist unsafe external protocols.
If an attacker has a file writing access to the user's default profile
directory, or somehow manages to update/create the file user.js (or
even worse - mozilla.cfg) he can override the patch's configuration
change, and enable the shell protocol handler again.
The user has already lost. Game over.
An attacker can exploit the ability to modify the user's configuration in
many different ways. E.g. redirect the browser to a proxy under the
attacker's control, make Mozilla use a trojanized Chrome or a trojanized
Java plugin, etc.
--Pavel Kankovsky aka Peak [ Boycott Microsoft--http://www.vcnet.com/bms ]
"Resistance is futile. Open your source code and prepare for assimilation."
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