http://www.google.com/search?q=%22Powered+By+kayako+eSupport%22+%22search+the+entire+knowledgebase%22
1290 customers according to Google.
http://support.kayako.com/index.php?_a=knowledgebase&_j=questiondetails&_i=2&nav=[XSS]&nav2=General%20eSupport%20Q&A
Vendor notified by their access log files (and this email to their sales staff):
http://support.kayako.com/index.php?_a=knowledgebase&_j=questiondetails&_i=2&nav=%3Cscript%3Ealert('msg')%3C/script%3E
Keeping this short and sweet since XSS vulns aren't that big of a deal
to find, even still. Clients login with cookies with a "remember me"
check box. I thought it was at least significant because of what "nav"
is for. The "nav" value is inserted as a subheading of the main page
node, and one website I saw this at inserted html code with a link in
the nav argument. Nice. One of those "double take" moments. This XSS
was used as a "feature", leveraged by a customer: a hosting company. I
was in awe. They should simply know better. So should Kayako.
Now, let's see how fast Kayako can release a security bulletin to their
customers. Isn't a security audit a part of every release?
No fix yet, since the code is proprietary. I always release fixes for
free software / open source code. I can't do that with proprietary
code, though.
Cheers,
Seth
P.S. Vendors have burned me and their users in the past for not fessing
up or giving credit where due; I agree with Linus Torvalds, vendor-sec
and ideas like it are a bad idea:
"I happen to believe in openness, and vendor-sec does not. It's that
simple." ( http://www.internetnews.com/dev-news/article.php/3458961 )
--
Seth Alan Woolley [seth at positivism.org], SPAM/UCE is unauthorized
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