Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes

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In-Reply-To: <20040831203815.13871.qmail@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

Diebold strongly refutes the existence of any "back doors" or "hidden codes" in 
its GEMS software.  These inaccurate allegations appear to stem from those not 
familiar with the product, misunderstanding the purpose of legitimate 
structures in the database.  These structures are well documented and have been 
reviewed (including at a source code level) by independent testing authorities 
as required by federal election regulations.
 
In addition to the facts stated above, a paper and an electronic record of all 
cast ballots are retrieved from each individual voting machine following an 
election. The results from each individual machine are then tabulated, and 
thoroughly audited during the standard election canvass process. Once the audit 
is complete, the official winners are announced.  Any alleged changes to a vote 
count in the election management software would be immediately discovered 
during this audit process, as this total would not match the true official 
total tabulated from each machine.  


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>From: "Jérôme" ATHIAS <jerome.athias@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>To: bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Subject: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account
>    Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes
>
>
>
>Date:  Tue, 31 Aug 2004 00:38:05 -0400
>Subject:  http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78
> 
>BlackBoxVoting.org reported a vulnerability in the Diebold GEMS central 
>tabulator.
> 
>A local authenticated user can enter a two-digit code in a certain "hidden" 
>location 
>to cause a second set of votes to be created on the system.  This second set 
>of votes 
>can be modified by the local user and then read by the voting system as 
>legitimate 
>votes, the report said.
> 
>GEMS 1.18.18, GEMS 1.18.19, and GEMS 1.18.23 are affected.
> 
>The vendor was reportedly notified on July 8, 2003.
>
> 
>Solution:  No vendor solution was available at the time of this entry.
> 
>Vendor URL:  www.diebold.com/dieboldes/GEMS.htm (Links to External Site) 
> 
>