Re: [Full-Disclosure] No shell => secure?

[Kevin Ponds <kponds@xxxxxxxxx>]

As has been discussed, really all you're doing is preventing against
canned exploits.

You're also going to be jumping ALOT of hoops to do this.


There are different ways to achieve the same result, look into canary
stack protection (such as propolice), and a "write or execute" stack,
such as W^X on OpenBSD or PaX on Linux.    Applying one of these will
at least force an attacker to write a custom exploit for your
configuration, and will give you alot less headaches than running
without shells or renaming file structure.

However as has been said many times before, security through obscurity
isn't really security at all.  It can buy you time and deter alot of
folks, but it won't make you secure.

Ponds

On Fri, 9 Jul 2004 21:14:07 +0545, npguy <npguy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Friday 09 July 2004 08:19 am, hax wrote:
> > 2)  That'd stop a lot of skript kiddies, I guess, but it'd be pretty
> > trivial to just rework the shellcode to call some other command
> > instead of /bin/sh.
> 
> if this is single target. attacker can guess your setting and keeping
> executing any commands it could possible target to execute more attack
> what about wget from shellcode.
> 
> 
> 
> _______________________________________________
> Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
> Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html
>

_______________________________________________
Full-Disclosure - We believe in it.
Charter: http://lists.netsys.com/full-disclosure-charter.html