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Re: [Full-Disclosure] Removing ShKit Root Kit



Thanks everyone for replies. I just took on this job for this client, the past security admin did nothing hence theres a rootkit. I dont plan on trying to save the box but its nice to look at forensic data so i know what to look out for next time. I used the tool examiner to comment the objdump on the ifconfig binary and im pretty sure theres a few sockets calls in there that dont belong. So im sure it was rooted.

Chris
www.cr-secure.net


Alexander Schreiber wrote:


On Sun, Dec 21, 2003 at 07:28:55PM -0500, Chris wrote:


Can anyone reccomend some links or useful information for removing the "ShKit Rootkit". CHKROOTKIT detected this thing on a RedHat 8.0 server owned by a client of mine.

"Searching for ShKit rootkit default files and dirs... Possible ShKit rootkit installed" <== chkrootkit output

I have only read limited information on this rootkit from a honeypot report where it was used, no cleaning information. Ive googled a bunch of times, dont go out of your way to answer this, the box will be redone anyway. Im just curious to find out what this rootkit is about, not even packetstorm has a copy to look at :)



There is exactly one way to properly clean up a rooted box: backup the system (for later analysis and for keeping any data that might be needed), wipe the disks and reinstall from known clean install media, update the system to get all current security updates und properly secure the box.

Just trying to "remove the rootkit" is not sufficient:
- the attacker might have installed more than one root kit,
- the attacker might have modified a standard root kit, rendering
a "standard removal procedure" for this particular rootkit
incomplete,
- the attacker might have used a formerly unknown rootkit, so you have
to analyze the system, - you might simply not find everything the attacker left, because kernel level tools where used and you are _running_ under the
modified kernel environment which nicely hides parts of the
modified system from you,
- last but not least: even if you manage to successfully remove the
rootkit, the original vulnerability which allowed the attacker
to take over the machine in the first place it likely still there


Regards,
Alex.




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