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Re: International Domain Name [IDN] support in modern browsers allows attackers to spoof domain name URLs + SSL certs.
- To: "Thor (Hammer of God)" <thor@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Subject: Re: International Domain Name [IDN] support in modern browsers allows attackers to spoof domain name URLs + SSL certs.
- From: bkfsec <bkfsec@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 16 Feb 2005 10:28:42 -0500
Thor (Hammer of God) wrote:
The number of people that you know (or who I know) that are aware of 
the uses for client
certificates is not what drives commercial certificate authority business
models.   The simple fact of the matter is that user-level 
certificates are an important part of the commercial certificate 
authority plan, and becoming more and more so as your "average" users 
become aware of certificate applications.
Actually, the number of people who are aware of the functioning and 
usage of certificates is very important to the web of trust and, as 
such, the business model.  The "trustworthiness" of the CA is only 
affected if enough people refuse to accept their certificates.
When I got my NIC handle untold years ago, only 561 other humans had 
one. Your logic would preclude getting one in the first place, since 
no one knew they existed at the time.  When SSL certs were first being 
created commercially, how many server operators did you know that had 
one?  How many do you know now?  It's the same thing with client 
certs, and the logic stands that certificate applications apply to 
them as well; particularly in regard to the business and marketing 
models various certificate authorities are running their business by.  
That was the point.
No - implying that my logic implies anything itself implies that I made 
a recommendation against certification.  I did no such thing. 
The CAs have many uses and the way that they are used right now is 
good.  However, the question is whether you can trust them to moderate 
IDN or any other site as trusted authorities.
My proposition is that the argument that they (and their associated webs 
of trust) are inherently trustworthy because of external pressures is a 
flawed assumption because they do not have the proposed level of 
pressure applied to them since most of the people affected by their web 
of trust don't understand it.
Until the average person can read and understand certs, my point stands.
            -Barry