RE: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Account Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes

[Bruce Barnett <barnett+bugtraq@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

> Let me add one more social dynamic.  The public will want to see
> instantaneous vote results, so eventually these computers will be
> networked to send the results back to a central voting computer ... And
> we are all familiar with how easily networked computer can be
> compromised if they aren't locked down.  Now we are also discussing Man
> In The Middle attacks, etc.

While the public would like this, the public would probably be denied
this option.

> (Which to me adds yet another social dynamic, if people see one person
> is winning that might change or sway their vote)

Exactly. This has happened. Districts in the Eastern Time Zone reported
the results, the people in the west coast would see the "preliminary
results", and decide not to vote because it "didn't make a difference."
In some cases, victory was declared because it was mathematically
impossible for a candidate to win without even counting the districts
in the Western time zones.

Now, the districts in the Eastern TIme Zone do not report the results
until those in the west coast CLOSE the polls.


I think having the voting machines disconnected from the network, until
reporting the results, is a requirement.  A firewall can make sure only
outgoing  connections are allowed, over a encrypted and verified
connection, AFTER the results are taken. This also makes sure that
every machine is given a fresh copy of the OS before the vote, and is
NEVER connected to any network (expect perhaps an isolated LAN in the
building) until the results are reported.

        This would prevent DoS attacks during the day.  Also - it would
be harder for a hacker to replicate the identity of a voting system
because the name and ID should not be determinable from the unconnected
system.