Re: Diebold Global Election Management System (GEMS) Backdoor Acc ount Allows Authenticated Users to Modify Votes

["David F. Skoll" <dfs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Tue, 28 Sep 2004, Adam Jacob Muller wrote:

> At a recent family gathering I spent about an hour trying to explain to
> various people why "open source" voting machines are more secure.

But security of voting machines is not (or should not be) the issue.

The issue is that we live in a democracy, and unless the average person
is able to satisfy for him/herself that the voting machinery is fair,
then it makes no difference whether it's open- or closed-source.

I'm an open-source advocate, but I think *any* kind of computerized
voting machine is disastrous.  Maybe a select few among us can verify
that the circuitry of the machine is OK, analyze the source code to verify
that it's OK, analyze the cryptography to verify that it's based on sound
principles, and analyze the binary code to verify that it came fom the
purported source code.

But that's not good enough.  Anyone capable of voting is capable of
understanding how to mark an X on a ballot, and the process of
securing, counting and validating the votes.  (This is the system we
use in Canada.)  And I direct complaints from anyone who says it will
take forever to count millions of votes to /dev/null.  People in a
vote-counting tree can count N votes in O(log N) time.

*Any* use of advanced "voting technology" is a step back for
democracy, because not only does it open the system up to fraud, but
it also disenfranchises the majority of the population who are now
unable to understand how their votes are counted and secured, and how
the counts are verified.

> I simply don't understand why a company doesn't do open source voting
> machines...

Because it's a non-solution to a non-problem:  Electronic voting machines
are not only unneccessary, they're harmful.

--
David.